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FLORIDA'S RESPONSE TO THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
IN FEDERAL AND STATE SECURITIES REGISTRATION
EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS
REX A.

HURLEY AND CARLA GREEN
I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal Securities Act of 19331 mandates that all securities
sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce or through the mails
must be registered with the Securities Exchange Commission (the
Commission).2 However, expenses associated with registration are
often so excessive that many small issuers are deterred from even
contemplating registration of their securities.' Instead, these smaller firms seek to qualify for an exemption from the federal registration requirement."
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act grants an exemption if the
transaction in question does not involve any "public offering."' 5 As
a general rule, this means that there is a limited number of offerees
and purchasers. 6 This category of securities offerings is known as a
"private placement" or "private offering." Section 3(b) of the Securities Act does not create an exemption, but confers upon the
Commission the authority to promulgate rules exempting issues of
securities if it finds that, "by reason of the small amount involved
or the limited character of the public offering," registration is "not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors." The offerings made under the exemptions created pursuant
to section 3(b) are referred to as "limited offerings."
The Commission has recently adopted a series of rules collectively referred to as Regulation D. 8 The purpose of these rules is to
clarify the private placement exemption granted under section 4(2)
of the Securities Act and to create limited offering exemptions as
authorized by section 3(b). Regulation D represents an effort by
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) (hereinafter "Securities Act").
2. Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
3. See generally Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities Law, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1
(1974).
4. There are two basic methods of avoiding the registration requirements of § 5 of the
Securities Act. The securities themselves may qualify for an exemption under § 3, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c (1982), or the transactions may qualify for an exemption under § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d
(1982). Some exemptions are created statutorily by the Securities Act, while others are created by administrative bodies acting pursuant to statutorily granted authority.
5. Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
6. But see SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
7. Securities Act § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(g) (1982).
8. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1982).
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the Commission to incorporate earlier private placement and limited offering exemptions for small businesses into a more coherent
scheme.9 The rules attempt to reduce the expense and burden of
registration for small issuers while at the same time providing adequate protection for the investing public.
Once the issuer has determined that one of the federal transactional exemptions is available, there remain the state registration
requirements of each state in which the securities will be sold.
These so called "blue sky" requirements, 0 like their federal counterpart, are often onerous, expensive, and time-consuming." Accordingly, issuers usually seek an exemption from the state registration requirements as well as from the federal requirements.
In many cases the state registration requirements differ from, or
are incompatible with, Regulation D. Additionally, the state registration requirements often differ from, or are incompatible with,
one another. This lack of uniformity between state and federal exemption requirements and among state requirements causes needless expense and imposes unwarranted burdens on issuers seeking
to sell their securities. In turn this hampers capital formation, and
its effect is greatest upon small businesses for whom the costs of
registration or of compliance with multiple exemption requirements are proportionally greater and may be prohibitive.
Congress recognized the problems inherent in multiple registration requirements when it enacted the Small Business Investment
Incentive Act of 1980, adding section 19(c) of the Securities Act
which authorizes the Commission "to cooperate with any association composed of duly constituted representatives of State governments whose primary assignment is the regulation of securities
business within those States" for purposes of "the development of
a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can
be agreed upon among several States or between the States and
9. An Analysis of Regulation D, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,631, at 86,888 (May 1984)
(citing Securities Act Release No. 33-6339 (Aug. 7, 1981)).
10. The term "blue sky" is attributed to a variety of origins. See, e.g., Hall v. Geiger
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1931) ("speculative schemes which have no more basis than so
many feet of 'blue sky' "); Mofsky, supra note 3, at 1 n.1 (citing L. Loss & E. CowETT, BLUE
SKY LAW 7 n.22 (1958)) ("The term 'blue sky' was first used to describe the business practices of promoters and securities salesmen in Kansas at the turn of the century. The activities of these individuals, it was claimed, bordered on the 'sale of building lots in the blue sky
in fee simple.' ").
11. See generally Royalty & Jones, The Private Placement Exemption and the Blue
Sky Laws-Shoals in the Safe Harbor,33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (1976); Note, A Primer
on Private Offerings, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 458 (1972). The Securities Act expressly provides in
§ 19(c)(3)(C) that the state laws are not preempted. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1982).
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the Federal Government.

' 12

Pursuant to the authorization of sec-

tion 19(c), the Commission cooperated with the North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), an organization
composed of securities administrators from all states, the Canadian
provinces, Mexico, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Guam,
in the development of Regulation D. 13 Not only was Regulation D
designed to provide a more coherent scheme of exemptions, but it
was also created to serve as a basis for a uniform federal-state exemption.14 At this time approximately twenty-eight states have
adopted an5 exemption which coordinates to some extent with Regulation D.1

While Regulation D served to promote uniformity between state
and federal exemption requirements, it only indirectly addressed
the problem of uniformity among the states. However, in September 1983, just eighteen months after the Commission's adoption of
Regulation D, NASAA endorsed a revised version of the Uniform
Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE), an exemption scheme intended to coordinate with Regulation D and to serve as a basis for
uniformity among the states. 16 In April 1984, the Commission and
NASAA met and agreed to undertake several substantive and procedural initiatives whose goals are (1) the development of mechanisms to foster cooperation among federal and state securities regulators, and (2) the enhancement of uniform federal and state
regulations. As part of that effort NASAA intends to urge states
which have not yet done so to adopt a uniform limited offering
exemption to coordinate with Regulation D, and to request states
which have adopted such exemptions to conform them to the
ULOE.17 Even more recently, in May 1984, the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association
issued a report to the House of Delegates in which it recommended
the adoption in all states of a1 8 slightly modified version of the
ULOE as endorsed by NASAA.

The purpose of this comment is to examine the extent to which
12. Securities Act § 19(c)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1982).
13. American Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Report to the House of Delegates 1-2 (May 1984) [hereinafter cited as Report].
14. An Analysis of Regulation D, supra note 9, at 86,887.
15. Id.
16. Securities and Exchange Commission and North American Securities Administrators
Association Conference on Federal-State Securities Regulation, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
83,610, at 86,753 (Apr. 1984).
17. Id. at 86,754.
18. Report, supra note 13, at 1.
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Florida has responded to the need for uniformity with the federal
exemption requirements and to discuss the steps Florida should
take in the future to more closely align its exemption scheme with
that of Regulation D and of the ULOE. The following discussion is
based on the premise that while uniformity is a desirable goal, it is
one which should not be sought without due consideration for the
needs and interests of investors as well as those of issuers.
II.

THE FEDERAL EXEMPTIONS

Discussion of Florida's most appropriate response to the need
for uniformity with federal registration exemption requirements
necessarily begins with an analysis of the federal scheme. In the
first place, a working knowledge of the federal exemptions is
needed to provide a basis for comparison with the Florida requirements. Furthermore, there is an interplay between the federal and
Florida registration requirements, as each must be satisfied, and
the practical operation of the state exemption may only be determined with reference to the federal scheme. Moreover, an understanding of the federal exemption scheme's treatment of the competing needs of investors for protection and of issuers for efficient
capital formation is helpful for purposes of determining, from a
policy point of view, the extent to which Florida should align its
exemption requirements with those of Regulation D and of the
ULOE.
The primary purpose of the registration requirement of section 5
of the Securities Act is to ensure that complete disclosure of the
business operations of the issuer is made to all offerees so that an
informed investment decision can be made. This reflects an underlying assumption of the federal securities laws which holds that
disclosure provides investor protection. 9 An issuer's failure to
comply with the substantive and procedural conditions of the Securities Act may result in a purchaser's actions for damages or return of any consideration paid,20 in an injunctive action by the
Commission, 2 ' or, in specified circumstances, in criminal
prosecution.22
When Congress drafted the Securities Act, however, it determined that certain transactions, because of their small offering
19.

See L. Loss,

20.
21.
22.

Securities Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
Id. § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b).
Id. § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION

7 (1983).
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amount or small number of purchasers, should not be subject to
federal registration. Therefore, Congress established the private
placement exemption of section 4(2) and at the same time granted
the Commission authority under section 3(b) to exempt limited offerings. The underlying rationale expressed for these exemptions
was that small businesses could not afford the burdensome transactional costs generally associated with complete registration.23
Section 4(2) initially proved to be so vague that its use was restricted as a practical matter. Uncertainty existed in the minds of
issuers as to what constituted a "public offering," and the potential
consequences of wrong judgment dissuaded many issuers from
risking reliance upon the exemption. In 1935, however, the general
counsel for the Commission issued a memorandum which emphasized the relevance of factors other than the number of offerees in
determining whether an offering was public, but also suggested
that under ordinary circumstances a twenty-five purchaser issue
was probably not large enough to constitute a public offering.2 4
This rule of thumb was widely relied upon until the 1953 case of
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., in which the United States Supreme
Court said that because the purpose of the Securities Act was "to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information
thought necessary to informed investment decisions, 2 5 it naturally
followed that "the exemption question turns on the knowledge of
the offerees ' ' 26 and on their need for the protections afforded by
registration. Ralston Purina held that section 4(2) required that
each offeree, and not just each purchaser, must have "access to the
same kind of information that the act would make available in the
2' 7
form of a registration statement.
The Ralston Purina decision effectively limited private placements to issues in which each offeree and purchaser had access to
information comparable to that disclosed by registration, an op23. See Note, Regulation D: Coherent Exemptions for Small Businesses Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 121, 123 n.20 (1982). See also SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 122 (1953) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1933)) (intent of the exemptions is to exempt offers and sales "where there is no practical
need for the [Securities Act's] application or where the public benefits are too remote").
24. Coles, Has Securities Law Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a Deterrent to Capital Growth: A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 395, 435 (1975) (citing
Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (1935)). In 1935, current § 4(2) was
numbered § 4(1).
25. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124.
26. Id. at 126-27.
27. Id. at 125. See generally Coles, supra note 24.
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portunity to verify that information, and the knowledge and experience required to evaluate the merits and risks of the investment.
Moreover, other judicial decisions involving interpretation of section 4(2) were viewed by many practitioners as tightening the eligibility requirements for private placement offerings even beyond
the requirements of Ralston Purina.2 As a result of these developments, issuers and commentators urged the Commission to promulgate "safe harbors," 2 ' compliance with which would ensure
compliance with section 4(2). Rule 14680 was the first safe harbor
provision and was the predecessor of Regulation D's safe harbor
provision contained in Rule 506.
Section 3(b) also experienced growing pains as the Commission
attempted to promulgate rules pursuant to its authority granted in
that section. Originally the Securities Act limited application of
section 3(b) to issues not exceeding $100,000. Since then, the cap
has been repeatedly raised and is currently set at $5,000,000. a
At the time it approved section 3(b), the House committee commented that the Commission's power under that section to exempt
28. See SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill-York Corp. v.
American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. In securities law, a safe harbor is a rule which clarifies and defines a statute. It is
nonexclusive in nature and permits the user the option of relying on the statutory exemption should compliance with the safe harbor be defective. L. Loss, supra note 19, at 375.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1982) (repealed 1982). See Schwartz, Rule 146: The Private
Offering Exemption-HistoricalPerspective and Analysis, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 738 (1974), for
a complete discussion of Rule 146. See also Carney, The Perils of Rule 146, 8 U. TOL. L.
REV. 343 (1977); Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 571, 589
(1977).
Basically, Rule 146 contained a codified version of all the elements of a private placement
thought necessary to balance the competing interests of investor protection and issuer access to financial markets. It required, in part:
(1) maximum of 35 purchasers, excluding certain relatives and persons who individually acquire an aggregate amount of $150,000 or more of the issue of
securities;
(2) disclosure of relevant, material information to each offeree or his
representative;
(3) criteria for determination of offeree and purchaser sophistication or wealth;
(4) prohibition on general solicitation and advertising;
(5) resale restrictions including determination of "investment intent," placing a
restrictive legend on the security, and issuing a stop-order instruction; and
(6) mandatory notification to the Commission.
Rule 146 was considered a failure by practitioners who were "disappointed by the complexity, precision, and obscurity of. . .the Rule, and particularly by its 'all or none' approach,
which require[d] satisfaction of all conditions of the Rule or loss of its exemption." Carney,
supra, at 346 (footnote omitted).
31. The ceiling was raised to $5,000,000 as part of the Small Business Simplification Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 301, 94 Stat. 2291 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982)).

19841

SECURITIES LAW EXEMPTIONS

securities from the registration requirements of the Securities Act
was "expected to be used only in a sparing manner. 3 2 The Commission heeded that directive and, prior to Regulation D, made
only a few attempts to promulgate limited offering exemptions."s
These early (pre-Regulation D) section 3(b) exemptions sought
to strike a balance between the competing needs of investors for
protection and of small issuers for capital. The needs of issuers
were aided by provisions reducing disclosure requirements and
eliminating subjective criteria. For example, Rule 240-3 contained
no requirements for disclosure of information. This rule, which applied to offerings up to $100,000, relied entirely upon the antifraud
provisions of the federal laws to provide investor protection. 6 Rule
242, s which was available for offerings up to $2,000,000, abandoned subjective purchaser sophistication requirements and replaced them with a provision restricting sales to any thirty-five
persons without qualification plus any number of "accredited investors. '37 Although Rules 240 and 242 were a significant induce32. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 606 (1961) (quoting the House Comm. on Int. &
For. Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933)).
33. The Commission's most notable limited offering exemption prior to Rules 504 and
506 of Regulation D was Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1982), discussed in Green
& Brecher, When Making a Small Public Offering Under Regulation A, 26 PRAC. LAW.,
Mar. 1, 1980, at 25, 41. Regulation A is frequently referred to as "short-form registration,"
although it is actually not registration at all, but is a conditional exemption. While § 12(2)
and § 10b-5 are applicable, § 11 liability for false registration statements does not apply to
literature employed in Regulation A offerings. L. Loss, supra note 19, at 340.
34. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1975) (repealed 1982).
35. Id. Rule 240 contained, generally, six conditions:
(1) Prohibition on general advertising and solicitation;
(2) Disposition and resale restriction;
(3) Filing of notice;
(4) Prohibition on paying sales commissions or similar remuneration;
(5) $100,000 offering limit for 12 months preceding each sale;
(6) Limit of 100 beneficial owners, excluding spouses, relatives, and certain entities beneficially owned by purchasers.
See Carney, Exemption from Securities Registrationfor Small Issuers: Shifting from Full
Disclosure-PartIII: The Small Offering Exemption and Rule 240, 11 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 483 (1976).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1982) (repealed 1982).
37. Rule 242 introduced the important concept of the accredited person. This concept
was an attempt to "link" the numerical limitation of 35 purchasers with a sophistication
requirement by excluding from the computation of the 35 purchasers a category of presumptively sophisticated institutional investors including banks, insurance companies, employee
benefit plans, investment companies, directors and officers of the issuer, and any purchaser
of $100,000 or more of the issuer's securities. See Parnall, Kohl & Huff, Privateand Limited
Offerings After a Decade of Experimentation: The Evolution of Regulation D, 12 N.M.L.
REv. 633, 663 (1982). Rule 242 also included the concept of the qualified issuer. Investment
companies and oil and gas operations were deemed unqualified issuers because of their
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ment to capital formation by small issuers, their technical and
practical flaws evoked substantial criticism. Rule 240 was criticized
because of its small offering amount and was deemed "not especially helpful to small business,'"" and Rule 242 contained burdensome disclosure requirements which limited its use by small companies whose capital needs exceeded the $100,000 amount
permitted under Rule 240."9
Not long after Rule 242 was adopted, the Commission developed
Regulation D which replaced Rules 240, 242, and 146.40 Regulation
D is composed of six rules, three of which establish or clarify exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
Rules 504 and 505, promulgated pursuant to section 3(b) of the
Securities Act, create limited offering exemptions, while Rule 506
is merely a safe harbor under the private placement exemption of
section 4(2). Rules 501, 502, and 503 contain general conditions applicable to offerings under the operative rules, Rules 504, 505, and
506.
Regulation D begins with a set of six introductory and explanatory notes. The first of these reiterates the fact that an issuer is
subject to the antifraud and civil liability provisions of the securities laws notwithstanding an exemption from registration.4 1 It also
reminds issuers of their obligation to provide additional material
information when needed to ensure that any required disclosure
made is not misleading. The second note recognizes the need for
issuers to comply with applicable state laws. It emphasizes the
Commission's intention that Regulation D function in a uniform
greater potential for abusing the rule. Securities Act Release No. 6180 (Jan. 17, 1980), [197982,426, at 82,815. See Parnall, Kohl &
1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Huff, supra, at 662. In addition to these provisions, Rule 242 contained a proscription
against general advertising and resales, various notification provisions, a limitation of 35
purchasers, a $2,000,000 offering ceiling, and liberal disclosure provisions. See generally
Thomforde, Relief for Small Business: Two New Exemptions from SEC Registration, 48
TENN.

L.

REV.

323 (1981)..

38. See Securities Act Release No. 6180, supra note 37, at 82,813. See also Securities Act
Release No. 5914 (Mar. 6, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,530,
at 80,149 (announcing a series of Commission-sponsored hearings which were subsequently
held and at which these difficulties were noted).
39. See Parnall, Kohl & Huff, supra note 37, at 664-66.
40. See An Analysis of Regulation D, supra note 9, at 86,886. Regulation D is codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1982). The provisions of Regulation D are hereinafter cited by
rule number and paragraph designation. Regulation D was adopted in Securities Act Release No. 6389 (Mar. 8, 1982), 11981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
83,106, at 84,907.
41. The protections of these provisions are available for investors in addition to
whatever protections are built into the requirements of the exemptions themselves.
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system of federal and state limited offering exemptions. The third
preliminary note assures issuers that unsuccessful attempted compliance with any rule under Regulation D does not act as an exclusive election which prevents reliance upon other rules and statutes.
It provides that if the issuer fails to qualify under Rule 506, Regulation D does not preclude reliance upon section 4(2) of the Securities Act. The fourth note highlights the fact that Regulation D is
merely a transactional exemption and the securities themselves
are not exempt. Therefore, the exemption is available only to an
issuer and will not exempt sales made by affiliates4 2 or resales
made by purchasers. 3 The fifth note confirms that Regulation D is
available to business combinations, while the sixth note warns that
technical compliance with the applicable conditions and rules may
be insufficient in some circumstances."
Rule 501, the first rule of Regulation D, discusses the method of
counting the number of purchasers. It excludes from the calculation certain persons and entities which are deemed protected by
virtue of their relationship to, or dominance by, an issuer, and the
resulting information about the issuer which they are presumed to
possess.4 5 Rule 501 also defines several terms not defined elsewhere
in the securities laws, including affiliate, ' 6 aggregate offering
price,4 7 business combination, 8 executive officer,49 issuer,5 0 pur42. See infra note 46 for the definition of affiliate.
43. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
44. Note 6 does not provide any examples of situations in which technical compliance
would be insufficient, but speaks of transactions which are "part of a plan or scheme to
evade the registration provisions of the Act."
45. Rule 501(e).
46. "An 'affiliate' of, or person 'affiliated' with, a specified person shall mean a person
that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by,
or is under common control with, the person specified." Rule 501(b). Cf. Rule 242(a)(2), 17
C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(2) (1982) (repealed 1982).
47. "'Aggregate offering price' shall mean the sum of all cash, services, property, notes,
cancellations of debt, or other consideration received by an issuer for issuance of its securities." Rule 501(c).
48. 'Business combination' shall mean any transaction of the type specified in paragraph (a) of rule 145 . . . and any transaction involving the acquisition by one
issuer, in exchange for all or a part of its own or its parent's stock, of stock of
another issuer if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring issuer has control of the other issuer (whether or not it had control before the acquisition).
Rule 501(d). Cf. Rule 146(0(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(0(1) (1982) (repealed 1982).
49. "'Executive Officer' shall mean the president, any vice president. . ., any other officer who performs a policy making function, or any other person who performs similar policy making functions for the issuer." Rule 501(0. Cf. Rule 242(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. §
230.242(a)(3) (1982) (repealed 1982).
50. "The definition of the term 'issuer' in section 4(2) of the Act shall apply.
... Rule
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chaser representatve, 51 and accredited investor.2 This last term
refers to an investor who is considered sufficiently wealthy or
financially sophisticated so as to be able to bargain for any necessary information concerning the proposed offering. Regulation D
borrowed the accredited investor concept from Rule 242, expanding it to include its present eight categories of investors
deemed able to "fend for themselves."5 "
Rule 502 delineates the general conditions relating to integration
of offerings, the manner of offerings, disclosure requirements, and
resale provisions. Noticeably absent from the general conditions is
any provision prohibiting the payment of commissions to brokers,
dealers, or other putative salespersons."
Regulation D's provisions with respect to integration5 5 are im501(g). Section 4(2) defines "issuer" as "every person who issues or proposes to issue any
security" and then enumerates various exceptions to that general definition. Securities Act §
4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1982). Cf. Rule 146(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(a)(2) (1982) (repealed
1982).
51. A purchaser representative is, broadly speaking, one who is unrelated to the issuer,
who is financially sophisticated, and who is acknowledged by the purchaser as his purchaser
representative. Rule 501(h). See Kessler, PrivatePlacement Rules 146 and 240-Safe Harbor?, FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 63-65 (1975), for an explanation of the definition of "offeree
representative."
52. The current "accredited investor" category includes any person or entity the issuer
reasonably believes falls within one of the following categories:
(1) Qualified institutional investors, including certain banks, investment companies, and employee benefit plans;
(2) Private business development companies;
(3) Tax exempt organizations with assets in excess of $5,000,000;
(4) Directors, executive officers, and general partners of the issuer;
(5) Persons who purchase at least $150,000 of the securities, so long as not in
excess of 20% of the purchaser's net worth;
(6) Natural persons with individual or joint net worth exceeding $1,000,000;
(7) Natural persons with income in excess of $200,000 for each of the past two
years; or
(8) Any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors under
Rule 501(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), or (7).
Rule 501(a). There are significant qualifications to each category. See Securities Act Release
No. 6389, supra note 40.
53. See Note, supra note 23, at 133.
54. In the past such sales commissions were restricted. This prohibition greatly reduced
employee incentive to assist the issuer in selling securities. The proscription ensured "that
the securities [were] not offered or sold by the use of 'high pressure tactics or otherwise
through organized securities distribution media,'" but at the same time it hampered the
issuer's ability to locate potential investors. See Parnall, Kohl & Huff, supra note 37, at 655
(citing Securities Act Release No. 5560 (Jan. 24, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,066, at 84,948).
. 55. "Integration" is a term unique to the securities field. It refers to
the time frame in
which an offering will be presumed to have occurred. Occasionally, what may be planned as
two separate and distinct offerings may be deemed integrated and therefore one large offer-
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portant for purposes of determining the offering period within
which the number of purchasers or the offering price will be calculated. Under the traditional test there were five factors which were
considered in determining whether offers and sales should be integrated. 5 Rule 502 provides an objective "safe harbor" whereby
sales and offers for sale occurring six months prior to or subsequent to the date of a Regulation D transaction will not be integrated. In situations where the safe harbor is not available, however, the traditional test applies.5
With regard to required disclosure, Regulation D has adopted a
dichotomous arrangement. On the one hand, for any offering made
pursuant to Rule 504 and for those offerings pursuant to Rule 505
or 506 which are restricted solely to accredited investors, Rule 502
does not require that any specific information be furnished to purchasers.58 On the other hand, for offerings under Rule 505 or 506
which involve a sale to any purchaser who is not an accredited investor, there are specific disclosure requirements which vary according to the size of the offering and the nature of the issuer.5
The nature of the issuer depends upon whether the issuer is a
reporting company under section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act.
If it is, the size of the offering is irrelevant, but if the issuer is a
nonreporting company, the disclosure requirements turn on
whether the issue exceeds $5,000,000.60
Since adequate information is already publicly available 'regarding. The consequences of such an occurrence may be disastrous as in the case of two distinct
private placements qualifying separately for the § 4(2) exemption which, if integrated,
would together constitute a nonexempt public offering. See Deaktor, Integration of Securities Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 465, 472-74 (1979) ("Integration under the [Securities Act]
is designed to prevent an issuer from avoiding registration of a nonexempt transaction by
accomplishing the transaction through two or more ostensibly distinct offerings each of
which, if treated as a separate transaction, would conform to the statute.").
56. Securities Act Release No. 33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962). Cf.
Securities Act Release No. 33-4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961). The traditional integration test involves subjective weighing of the following five factors:
(a) Whether the offerings are part of a single plan of financing;
(b) Whether the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security;
(c) Whether the offerings are made at or about the same time;
(d) Whether the same type of consideration is to be received;
(e) Whether the offerings are made for the same general purpose.
57. Rule 502(a).
58. Rule 502(b)(i).
59. Rule 502(b)(ii).
60. This distinction exists because Form S-18 is unavailable for reporting companies or
issues greater than $5,000,000. See Securities Act Release No. 6389, supra note 40, at 84,916
n.21.
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ing reporting companies, those issuers may simply furnish offerees
either (1) their most recent shareholders' annual report and proxy
statement (and Form 10-K 61 if requested), or (2) information contained in their annual report on Form 10-K or in a registration
statement on Form S-16 2 or Form 10.83 In either case the issuer
must furnish a brief description of the securities, the use of proceeds from the offering, and any material changes in its affairs
which are not reflected in the foregoing documents.6 Nonreporting
companies, on the other hand, must furnish offerees the same information which would have been included in a prospectus if the
offer had been registered. 65 In all cases the issuer must furnish investors an opportunity to ask questions and obtain additional information.6" This last requirement is usually met by holding a
"seminar" at which management makes a presentation and then
answers questions.
Rule 502 provides, with respect to the manner of offerings, that
the issuer generally may not utilize any form of general solicitation
or general advertising.67 Newspaper and magazine advertisements
are forbidden, as are television and radio communications. Likewise, general solicitations and open invitations to seminars or
meetings are proscribed. In many instances issuers may be forced
to develop lists of potential customers and then personally solicit
them. The rule does not, however, absolutely prohibit the use of
mail as a means of inviting persons to seminars." Additionally, in
states which require registration of the securities and delivery of a
disclosure document, the federal restriction on the manner of offering is preempted in an offering under Rule 504 in favor of any requirements the state imposes.6 9
Rule 502 expressly provides that securities acquired in a Regulation D offering cannot be resold by the purchaser absent registration or an applicable exemption.7 0 Without this provision, sales
61. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1982).
62. Id. § 239.11.
63. Id. § 249.210.
64. Rule 502(b)(2)(ii).
65. Rule 502(b)(2)(i). There is, however, an available escape valve. If an audited financial
statement cannot be prepared "without unreasonable effort or expense," then all that is
required is a very recent balance sheet. Rule 502(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B). There is a slightly different
escape valve provided for limited partnerships. Id.
66. Rule 502(b)(2)(v).
67. Rule 502(c). Cf. Rule 146(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c) (1982) (repealed 1982).
68. Securities Act Release No. 6389, supra note 40, at 84,917 n.23.
69. Rule 502(c).
70. Rule 502(d).

19841

SECURITIES LAW EXEMPTIONS

under the private placement exemption might merely be the first
step in a conduit by way of which unregistered securities flow from
the issuer to the public. Rule 502 also provides that the issuer shall
exercise "reasonable care" to ensure that purchasers are not statutory "underwriters" as defined in section 2(11) of the Securities
Act. 71 If a purchaser becomes an underwriter by virtue of the resale of the securities, the issuer may lose its exemption. 72 The required care can be presumptively shown by the issuer if it demonstrates (1) reasonable inquiry to determine whether the purchaser
is acquiring the securities for his own investment or on behalf of
another; (2) presale written disclosure informing each purchaser
that the securities have not been registered and therefore cannot
be resold unless they are registered or unless an exemption from
registration is available; and (3) placement of a legend on the certificate indicating that the securities have not been registered and
that there are restrictions on their transferability.78 If, however,
the securities are issued pursuant to Rule 504 in states which require registration of the securities and delivery of a disclosure document, there are no resale restrictions.74
Unlike its predecessor rules, Regulation D employs uniform
forms for use with any of the three operative rules. Notice of sale is
accomplished under Rule 503 by filing Form D 75 with the Commission at various specified times during the course of an offering.76
The purpose of the notice requirement is to provide a means of
assessing the effectiveness and usefulness of Regulation D as a capital raising device for small businesses.
71. Id.
72. This is so because the resale of unregistered securities generally is permitted under §
4(1) of the Securities Act, which provides that the registration requirements of § 5 shall not
apply to "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(1) (1982). If, however, a purchaser is an underwriter as defined in § 2(11), the exemption of § 4(1) is not available. Because determination of a person's status as an underwriter
under § 4(1) in turn involves several subjective determinations such as whether a purchase
was "with a view to" the "distribution" of any security, the safe harbor provision of Rule
144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1982) is often relied upon as a means of ensuring compliance with
§ 4(i).
73. Rule 502(d). Cf. Rule 242(g), 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(g) (1982) (repealed 1982).
74. Rule 502(d).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 (1982).
76. In addition, upon request, the issuer must provide the Commission with copies of
information furnished by nonaccredited investors. Rule 503(d).
77. Rule 503(a)(2). See Securities Act Release No. 6339 (Aug. 7, 1981), [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 83,014, at 84,465. The Commission has recently
issued a release reporting results of a study of the general operation of Regulation D in its
first year (Apr. 15, 1982-Apr. 14, 1983). See An Analysis of Regulation D, supra note 9, at
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Rule 504 is a de minimis exemption which applies to offerings of
less than $500,000.8 It is intended to be used to "facilitate the capital formation needs of the small start-up company seeking venture
capital, and not seasoned issuers for which information is readily
available by means of Exchange Act documents. 7T Therefore, it is
restricted to issuers that are not already reporting companies or
investment companies (mutual funds).8 0 In determining the offering price of $500,000, the rule requires aggregation of all sales during the preceding twelve months made pursuant to Rule 504, Rule
505, or Regulation A, and of all sales made in violation of section 5
of the Securities Act.8 1 Rule 504 contains no investor qualification
standards and permits sale to an unlimited number of investors.
Sales commissions are permitted under the rule, but general solicitation and general advertising 2 and resale8s are prohibited unless
the securities are offered and sold exclusively in states requiring
delivery of a disclosure document.
Rule 505's exemption is available to all issuers with the exception of investment companies.8 4 It is available for offerings whose
aggregate offering price does not exceed $5,000,000 or, if securities
have been sold within the last twelve months, $5,000,000 less the
aggregate offering price for all securities sold under a Regulation D
exemption within the twelve months before and during the offering
in question." Rule 505 permits an offering to as many as thirtyfive investors without qualifications plus any number of accredited
investors."e Sales commissions are permitted under the rule, but
86,886. The findings indicate that issuers claiming an exemption under Regulation D offered
an estimated $15.5 billion of securities, approximately 17% of the total amount effectively
registered for cash sale to the public. Almost 50% of all Regulation D offerings claimed a
Rule 506 exemption; 25% claimed Rule 504; 13% claimed Rule 505; and another 13%
claimed more than one exemption. The average size for an offering was $2,100,000, indicating Regulation D is being used primarily by small issuers. The typical corporate issuer tends
to have five or fewer employees, an operating history of two years or less, four shareholders,.
500,000 or fewer shares outstanding, revenues and assets of $500,000 or less, and shareholders' equity of $50,000 or lss. Accredited investors provided 71% of all monies raised, and
over one-third of all monies raised resulted from offerings sold only to accredited investors.
Id.
78. Rule 504(b)(2).
79. Securities Act Release No. 6339, supra note 77, at 84,467.
80. Rule 504(a).
81. Rule 504(b)(2).
82. Rule 504(b)(1).
83. Id.
84. Rule 505(a).
85. Rule 505(b)(2)(i).
86. Rule 505(b)(2)(ii).
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general solicitation is prohibited and resale is restricted. 87
Rule 506, the private placement exemption safe harbor, is available to any issuer which meets the requirements of Rules 501, 502,
and 503.88 It permits the issuer to raise an unlimited amount of
capital and permits sale to as many as thirty-five qualified (sophisticated) investors plus any number of accredited investors. 89 While
accredited investors are presumed to be sophisticated, with respect
to all other purchasers Rule 506 requires that the issuer reasonably
believes, prior to sale, that the investor has, either alone or with
his purchaser representative," "such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the
merits and risks of the prospective investment."9 1
This last qualification is important because ignoring the business
acumen of offerees raises the spectre of forfeiting the independent
statutory exemption of section 4(2). Although imperfect compliance with the safe harbor of Rule 506 does not preclude an issuer
from relying on section 4(2), offeree sophistication is a virtual condition precedent to utilization of section 4(2), and if the issuer fails
to qualify for a Rule 506 exemption because of failure to comply
with the purchaser sophistication requirement of Rule 506, it most
likely simultaneously fails to otherwise qualify for a section 4(2)
exemption.'2

III.

THE FLORIDA EXEMPTION

Just as the federal securities law has developed over the years, so
too has the Florida law, often in response to the federal evolution.93 Regulation D became effective in 1982, and in 1983 the
87. Rule 505(b)(1).
88. Rule 506(a).
89. Rule 506(b)(2)(i).
90. See supra note 51.
91. Rule 506(b)(2)(ii).
92. But see Waters, Sophistication and the Private Offering of Securities in Alabama-A Lack of Federal and State Law Coordination,44 ALA. LAW. 240 (1983).
93. The original Florida blue sky law was enacted in 1913. It was patterned after the
Kansas act which had first alerted the country to the necessity of securities regulation. See
J. MoFsKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BusiNEss PROMOTIONS 20 (1971); Ch. 6422, 1913
Fla. Laws 56. The later 1931 Florida Sale of Securities Law was a modified version of the
original Uniform Sale of Securities Law. It was adopted with the intention of making Florida securities laws consistent with the Uniform Act and regulations of other states. The
Uniform Act proved to be a failure and eventually was removed from the list of approved
acts in 1944. See Robinton & Sowards, Florida'sBlue Sky Law: The Lawyer's Approach, 6
MIAMI L.Q. 525, 527 n.7 (1952); Ch. 14899, § 22, 1931 Fla. Laws 797. Interestingly, the Florida legislature very recently changed the name of ch. 517, Florida Statutes from "Florida
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Florida legislature responded by making modifications to the Florida scheme of exemptions.9 4 Although these modifications served
to increase uniformity between the federal and state law, the Florida exemption scheme is not yet wholly compatible, on its face or
in operation, with the currently existing federal scheme.
The primary Florida exemption is found in section 517.061(12),
Florida Statutes. 5 This exemption is available to any issuer and
contains no aggregate offering price limitation. The exemption permits an offering to as many as thirty-five investors in the state in
any twelve-month period. 6 It contains no investor sophistication
requirements91 but excludes from the computation of the number
of purchasers all accredited investors, certain relatives of purchasers; certain affiliated trusts, estates, and corporations, and certain
purchasers making an investment of $100,000 or more."
Section 517.061(12) prohibits general solicitation and general advertising9 9 and proscribes the payment of sales commissions to unregistered dealers. 0 0 The exemption provides for a three-day
voidability period when sales are made to five or more purchasers. 10 1 It also requires that each purchaser or his representative be
provided with, or given reasonable access to, "full and fair disclosure of all material information" prior to the sale.'0 2 With respect to
integration of offerings, the Florida exemption provides for a sixmonth safe harbor period. 103 It further provides for consideration
Securities Act" to "Florida Investor Protection Act." 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 84-159
(West). Additionally, the legislature increased the scope of the act by broadly defining "investment" to mean, with several exceptions, "any commitment of money or property, not
otherwise a security as defined in this chapter, in expectation of receiving an economic benefit, offered or sold in violation of s. 517.301 or s. 517.311." Id.
94. Ch. 83-184, 1983 Fla. Laws 716 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 517.021, .061(12)(a)(b), .12(10), (14) (1983). See Van Nortwick & Thompson, Regulation and the Amended
Florida Private Placement Exemption, 57 FLA. B.J. 578 (1983).
95. There are other transactional exemptions in § 517.061, including § 517.061(19) which
exempts offers and sales of securities federally registered with the Commission. See FLA.
STAT. § 517.061 (1983).
96. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(a)(1) (1983).
97. But see FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 3E-500.07(3) (Supp. 1983). See also infra note 107 and
accompanying text.

98.

FLA. STAT.

§ 517.061(12)(b) (1983). See also FLA.

ADMIN. CODE

R. 3E-500.04 (Supp.

1983).
99. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(a)(2) (1983). But see FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 3E-500.07(3)
(Supp. 1983).
100. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(a)(4) (1983). See also FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 3E-500.06
(Supp. 1983).
101. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(a)(5) (1983).
102. Id. § 517.061(12)(a)(3). See also FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 3E-500.05 (Supp. 1983).

103.

FLA. STAT.

§ 517.061(12)(c)(1) (1983). See also

FLA. ADMIN.

CODE

R. 3E-500.01
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of "the particular facts and circumstances in each case" in determining whether offers and sales not falling within the safe harbor
provision will be integrated.""4
In addition to the exemption created under section 517.061(12),
there is a statutory provision authorizing the Department of Banking and Finance (the Department) to adopt rules creating exemptions from Florida registration upon a finding by the Department
that registration "is not necessary in the public interest and for the
protection of investors because of the small dollar amount of securities involved or the limited character of the offering." 10 5 To date,
however, no exemptions have been created by the Department pursuant to this authority.
Section 517.061(12) is perhaps most analogous to Rule 506 of
Regulation D. It is not, however, a pure private placement exemption, but contains a curious assortment of federal private placement and limited offering exemption features. It also contains several features which have no federal counterpart.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Florida exemption is its
provision for an unlimited offering amount coupled with the absence of any investor sophistication requirements. At first glance
this state scheme appears to provide less investor protection than
the federal scheme. It must be remembered, however, that an issuer seeking exemption from state registration is likely to be seeking exemption from federal registration as well. If so, the issuer
will probably need to comply with the requirements of one of Regulation D's exemptions. None of those exemptions permits an unlimited offering to a potentially unsophisticated group of investors.
Rules 504 and 505 have limited offering amounts of $500,000 and
$5,000,000, respectively, while Rule 506 requires purchaser sophistication or accredited investor status. Thus, for practical purposes,
an issuer seeking exemption from Florida registration will most
likely be subject, under federal requirements, to either an offering
price limitation or the requirement of purchaser sophistication or
accredited investor status. On the other hand, in limited instances
an issuer may be simultaneously seeking exemption from federal
registration under the intrastate exemption of section 3(a)(11) of
the Securities Act'06 and from state registration under the Florida
exemption of section 517.061(12). In those situations the issuer is
(Supp.
104.
105.
106.

1983).
FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(c)(2) (1983).
Id. § 517.061(21).
Securities Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982).
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not subject under the federal exemption to either an offering
amount limitation or the requirement of purchaser sophistication
or accredited investor status.
However, it should be noted that while there are no investor sophistication requirements in section 517.061(12), the Division of
Securities of the Florida Department of Banking and Finance has,
by way of rule, indirectly imposed investor sophistication requirements. Rule 3E-500.07 defines general solicitation and general advertising to include seminars, meetings, letters, circulars, notices,
and other written communications unless the issuer has reasonable
grounds to believe after inquiry and does believe that those invited
to or attending any seminar or meeting or receiving any letter, circular, notice, or other written communication are both "able to
bear the economic risk to the prospective investment" and "have
such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters
as to be capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment" or, if invited to or attending any seminar or meeting, are accompanied by an investment adviser. 10 7 Thus, there are
investor sophistication requirements under the Florida exemption
in any offerings where the issuer employs seminars, meetings, letters, circulars, notices, and other written communications to advertise the securities and solicit purchases of those securities.
Another noteworthy feature of the Florida exemption is its treatment of the resale of securities. The exemption of section
517.061(12) applies only to issuers and thus is not available to
reselling purchasers.108 Rather, section 517.061(3), the Florida
counterpart to federal section 4(1), is the section applicable to purchasers seeking to resell securities acquired in a transaction exempt from registration under the primary Florida exemption. Section 517.061(3) exempts isolated sales and offers for sale made by
or on behalf of a seller who is not the issuer or underwriter and
who, as the bona fide owner, makes the disposition on his own behalf. Such isolated offers and sales include specifically those made
09
in a transaction exempt under section 4(1) of the Securities Act'
or in a transaction satisfying all the requirements of section
517.061(12) except the three-day voidability provision. 110 Section
107.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE

R. 3E-500.07(3) (Supp. 1983).

108. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(a) (1983) ("[tlhe offer or sale, by or on behalf of an issuer,
which offer or sale is part of an offering made in accordance with all of the following conditions . .") (emphasis added).
109. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(3)(b) (1983).
110. Id. § 517.061(3)(a).
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517.061(3) also provides that no person shall be deemed an underwriter or issuer with respect to any securities he has beneficially
owned for at least a year. This presumably includes unregistered
securities acquired in a section 517.061(12) transaction.
In most instances, the Florida resale provision will have no practical effect. When the original purchaser is seeking to resell securities acquired in a Regulation D transaction, a section 4(1) exemption is theoretically available,"' but as a practical matter the seller
will be required to comply with the safe harbor provisions of Rule
144."' Otherwise the reselling investor risks being deemed a nonexempt statutory underwriter. This not only results in the seller
violating section 5, but may cost the issuer the loss of its exemption, exposing it to potential section 12(1) civil liability. On the
other hand, by satisfying the requirements of Rule 144 (and thus
section 4(1)), a selling shareholder also satisfies the section
517.061(3) exemption. The Florida exemption also contains what is
basically a safe harbor in its provision that any person, including,
without limitation, a promoter or affiliate of an issuer, who has
beneficially owned securities for at least one year "shall not be
deemed an underwriter, an issuer, or a person acting for the direct
or indirect benefit of the issuer or an underwriter" with respect to
those securities." 3 While this provision makes it easier to avoid underwriter status than does the federal law,' 1 4 a selling shareholder
must still comply with Rule 144's two-year holding period in order
to qualify for the federal section 4(1) exemption. Thus, the Florida
resale provisions of section 517.061(3) have no operative effect except to the extent they allow state, as well as federal, enforcement
of resale restrictions. Moreover, they may in fact be misleading and
confusing to issuers and investors since they invite resale after one
year and thus loss of Rule 144's safe harbor.
In contrast to federal Rule 502, which requires particularized
disclosure," 5 the Florida exemption essentially codifies the antifraud rules in its requirement that the issuer provide purchasers
with, or afford them reasonable access to, "full and fair disclosure
of all material information.""1 6 Additionally, while Regulation D
does not require any specific disclosure when the securities are sold
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See supra note 72 and accompanying
17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1982).
FLA. STAT. § 517.061(3) (1983).
See supra note 72 and accompanying
See supra note 59 and accompanying
FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(a)(3) (1983)

text.

text.
text.
(emphasis added).
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only to accredited investors,11 7 the Florida exemption contains no
comparable exception to its disclosure requirements in the case of
offerings made only to accredited investors." ' To the extent that
the Florida exemption requires disclosure of information which an
issuer must already disclose under federal law to prevent liability
under Rule 10b-5, the Florida requirement seems unnecessary, and
the absence of an exception for offerings made only to accredited
investors seems insignificant. On the other hand, the presence of a
disclosure requirement in the Florida exemption permits state, as
well as federal, regulation of issuers' disclosure practices." 9 In
some instances it may also result in liability under state law where
there would be no comparable liability under federal law.
For example, in the case of an offering made only to accredited
investors, the only potential liability under federal law for improper disclosure would be liability under Rule 10b-5, which requires proof of scienter. 20 Because there is no disclosure requirement in Regulation D itself for offerings made only to accredited
investors, improper disclosure would not result in absolute liability
under section 12(1). However, because the Florida exemption requires disclosure regardless of who the purchasers are, and because
the disclosure requirement is contained in section 517.061(12) itself, under Florida law there would be potential liability under
both section 517.211(1) (the Florida counterpart to section 12(1))
and section 517.301(1) (the Florida anitfraud provision) for an offering made only to accredited investors for which there was improper disclosure. Under either of these provisions, liability may
lie even without proof of scienter, 12 and there might thus be liability under state law without scienter in situations where there
would be no liability under federal law unless scienter were proved.
Another respect in which the Florida exemption differs from
Regulation D is in the area of sales commissions. Regulation D
does not prohibit the payment of sales commissions,1 2 a subject
which is intentionally left to state regulation. The Florida exemption prohibits the payment of a commission or compensation for
the sale of the issuer's securities to any dealer who is not regis117. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
119. There are numerous remedies available under ch. 517 of the Florida Statutes. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 517.191, .211, .221, .241 (1983).
120. See generally, L. Loss, supra note 19, at 870-900 (1983).
121. See FLA. STAT. §§ 517.211(1), .301(1) (1983).
122. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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tered.1 23 It permits payment to registered dealers and, by virtue of
the definition of dealer, permits payment to certain other individuals, including any "bona fide employee of the issuer who has not
participated in the distribution or sale of any securities within the
preceding twelve months and who primarily performs or is intended to perform at the end of the distribution, substantial duties
• ..other than in connection with transactions in securities." 12
The practical effect of the Florida exemption is to place an additional burden upon issuers, not present under federal law, to ensure that any dealers participating in the issue are registered. It is
questionable whether dealer licensing is so useful that this provision actually affords additional investor protection. If it is not, and
the Florida provision does not afford enhanced investor protection,
the added burden on issuers is not justifiable.
With respect to the manner of offering, section 517.061(12) contains a blanket prohibition on general solicitation and general advertising. 12 5 So, too, do Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, and so
also does Rule 504 except for offers and sales made exclusively in,
and in compliance with the requirements of, states which provide
for registration of securities and which require the delivery of a
disclosure document before sale. 26 While the Florida exemption
might, by virtue of its unqualified prohibition on general solicitation and general advertising, be viewed as more restrictive than
Rule 504, it should be noted that an offering as limited in amount
as one under Rule 504 would most often not require general solicitation and general advertising. In those cases, the Florida exemption's more restrictive provision would have no operative effect.
However, there may be situations where section 517.061(12) prohibits solicitation or advertising that would otherwise be allowed,
and in any event the prohibition, by virtue of its position in the
Florida exemption, is thereby subject to both state and federal
enforcement.
In its provisions relating to the integration of offerings, the state
exemption is compatible with Regulation D.127 Similarly, the two
schemes contain identical definitions of accredited investor. 2 8
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
text.
128.

FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(a)(4) (1983).

Id. § 517.021(7).
Id. § 517.061(12)(a)(2). But see FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 3E-500.07 (Supp. 1983).
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(c) (1983). See also supra note 55 and accompanying
See FLA.

STAT.

§ 517.021(1) (1983). See also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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With respect to the calculation of the number of purchasers, the
Florida scheme diverges from the federal scheme in one respect.
While both Regulation D and section 517.061(12) exclude from the
calculation of number of purchasers all accredited investors, certain relatives of the purchasers, and certain related trusts, estates,
and corporations, 12 9 section 517.061(12) also excludes "[any purchaser who makes a bona fide investment of $100,000 or more, provided such purchaser or his representative receives, or has access
to, the information required to be disclosed by [section
517.061(12)(a)(3)]. 1 ' 30 This facial difference in the Florida exemption has little operative effect, however. Since such purchasers
must be counted towards the thirty-five-purchaser limit in Rules
505 and 506, the Florida provision, although more lenient than
Rules 505 and 506, cannot be used in Rule 505 or 506 offerings.
Interestingly, the Florida provision can be utilized in conjunction
with Rule 504, but there the Florida provision is more restrictive
than Rule 504 which permits an unlimited number of investors. In
Rule 504 offerings, however, the Florida exemption's thirty-fivepurchaser limit probably seldom is of concern to issuers. Because
Rule 504 offerings have an aggregate price offering limitation of
only $500,000, such offerings do not generally involve a large number of purchasers.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Florida exemption,
when compared with Regulation D, is the three-day voidability
provision of section 517.061(12)(a)(5). 3 ' This feature has no federal counterpart and affords a measure of protection unavailable
under the federal exemptions. In the event an investor is subjected
to high pressure sales tactics, he has three days in which to reflect
upon his investment and, if need be, rescind it. Not only does the
Florida voidability feature afford additional investor protection,
but it does so with comparatively little cost to the issuer. Essentially, the provision means little more to the issuer than that it
must wait three days before treating a sale as final.
See FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(b) (1983). See also Rule 501(e).
130. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(b)(4) (1983).
131. This feature of the Florida exemption provides:
When sales are made to five or more persons in this state, any sale in this state
made pursuant to this subsection shall be voidable by the purchaser in such sale
either within three days after the first tender of consideration is made by such
purchaser to the issuer, an agent of the issuer, or an escrow agent or within three
days after the availability of that privilege is communicated to such purchaser,
whichever occurs later.
FLA. STAT. § 517.061(12)(a)(5) (1983).
129.
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IV.

THE UNIFORM LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTION

The ULOE as endorsed by NASAA begins with three preliminary notes. The first of these provides that the antifraud provisions of the state's securities laws are applicable notwithstanding
an issuer's compliance with the ULOE.'52 The second note provides that an exemption may not be available, despite technical
compliance with the exemption, if the transaction "is part of a
plan or scheme to evade registration or the conditions or limitations explicitly stated in [the] rule."'3 3 The third note states that
the exemption in no way relieves registered broker/dealers and
agents from applicable requirements of law including the due diligence, suitability, and know-your-customer standards.'"
The ULOE provides exemption from state registration for transactions which comply with Rule 505 and with a number of further
conditions and limitations. It also provides an optional exemption
for transactions which are exempt from federal registration under
Rule 506 and which also comply with certain additional conditions
and limitations.'3 5 The ULOE prohibits payment of commissions,
fees, or other remuneration to any person for soliciting prospective
purchasers unless the person is appropriately registered in the
state. 136 An alternate provision, however, would require all persons
who offer or sell securities to accredited or nonaccredited investors
to be registered.' 3 7 The ULOE is unavailable if the issuer, its predecessors, or its affiliates have been or are currently subject to certain specified securities enforcement measures.3 5 The basic ULOE
requires presale filing of notice on Form D with the state administrator in addition to notice to the Commission as required by Rule
503,1'9 although an alternate provision would permit postsale notice only.'40 The exemption also requires that, in the case of sales
132. ULOE, preliminary note 1, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 5294, at 1273 (1983).
133. ULOE, preliminary note 2, id.
134. ULOE, preliminary note 3, id.
135. The text of the ULOE provides, in Rule 1, that an exemption is available for "[a]ny
offer or sale of securities offered or sold in compliance with [the] Securities Act of 1933,
Regulation D, Rules 230.501-230.503 and 230.505 (and/or 230.506) . . ." (emphasis added).
Footnote 1 of the ULOE states that "it would not be inconsistent with the regulatory objectives of this exemption for a state to elect to accept Rule 506 offerings within the ambit of
this exemption." ULOE, note 1, id. at 1273-4.
136. ULOE, Rule 1A, supra note 132, at 1273.
137. ULOE, note 2, id. at 1273-5.
138. ULOE, Rule 1B, id. at 1273-3.
139. ULOE, Rule 1C, id. at 1273-3.
140. ULOE, note 4, id. at 1273-5.

332

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:309

to nonaccredited investors, the issuer "[must] have reasonable
grounds to believe and after making reasonable inquiry [must] believe that" either (1) the investment is "suitable for the purchaser"
based upon disclosed facts relating to the purchaser's security
holdings and financial situation and needs, or (2) the purchaser,
alone or with a representative, has sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters so as to be capable of evaluating the prospective investment's merits and risks. 141 With respect
to the former possibility, the ULOE provides a safe harbor if the
investment does not exceed ten percent of the purchaser's net
worth. 42 Finally, the ULOE provides that transactions exempt
under its provisions may not be combined with other exempt offers
and sales, 43 that unsuccessful reliance on the ULOE does not preclude reliance on other applicable exemptions, 44 and that the administrator may increase the number of purchasers or waive other
provisions of the exemption. 4"
Recently the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law
of the American Bar Association (ABA) suggested, with three qualifications, adoption of the ULOE as endorsed by NASAA. The first
qualification is that Rule 506, suggested only as a footnote alternative in the NASAA version of the ULOE, should be a part of the
ULOE as adopted by the states. Second, the ABA noted that footnote 2 would require uncompensated persons involved in sales to
register. This requirement was viewed as a "major departure from
present state securities laws, in that the exemption could be jeopardized by casual telephone calls made by persons not compensated by (and perhaps even unknown to) the issuer. "146 Therefore,
the ABA qualified its endorsement of the ULOE with the comment
that this alternate provision should not be part of the uniform exemption. The ABA's final qualification with respect to endorsement of the NASAA version of the ULOE relates to the presale
notice requirement. The ABA's position was that Regulation D's
postsale notice, recognized by NASAA as an acceptable alternative,
was preferable and should be made part of the uniform
exemption. 47
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

ULOE, Rule 1D, id. at 1273-4.
Id.
ULOE, Rule 2, id. at 1273-4.
Id.
ULOE, Rule 3, id.
Report, supra note 13, at 3.
Id. at 1.
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The ABA's recommendations for modification of the NASAA
version of the ULOE seem well-advised. NASAA did not affirmatively recommend inclusion of Rule 506 offerings within the ambit
of the ULOE because of concern over the difficulty in large private
offerings of determining that all investors are sophisticated and the
magnification of the difficulty of controlling the manner and scope
of the offering. NASAA also mentioned concern over the potential
use of Rule 506 for tax shelter offerings which "have a greater potential for regulatory concerns." '148 The utility of the ULOE would
be considerably enhanced by inclusion of Rule 506, however, since
many small businesses need more than the $5,000,000 permitted by
Rule 505. The flexibility and utility of a ULOE which includes
Rule 506 offerings seem to outweigh the potential problems inherent in such a scheme. Additionally, the ABA's concern about requiring registration of uncompensated persons engaging in offering
and selling seems well-founded. Because such a requirement might
create situations where the exemption could inadvertently be jeopardized, and because that requirement would be a major departure
from current law, that alternative in NASAA's ULOE should be
rejected. Finally, there does not appear to be any particular benefit
to investors in the basic ULOE's requirement of presale notice,
and this added burden on issuers should be avoided, as recommended by the ABA.
In its report, the ABA noted that "substantial variations exist
among the versions of ULOE adopted in the several states which
have acted by rule or statute." The ABA stated it will seek to
persuade those states with nonconforming ULOE's to adopt the
current version or some less stringent conforming standard....
The overall objective is to achieve a national exemptive structure whereby an issuer, which observes the most restrictive ULOE
version in effect, can be assured of compliance with all applicable
securities regulations, both state and federal, by properly completing the joint NASAA/SEC Form D and filing it, along with
the appropriate fee, if any, with the SEC and the applicable
states and have no further concern about technical filing, disqualification or disclosure requirements. 4
148.

ULOE, note 1, supra note 132, at 1273-4.

149.

Report, supra note 13, at 4.
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UNIFORMITY

Uniformity Between the Federal and State Exemption
Schemes

Examination of section 517.061(12) in relation to Regulation D
reveals a state exemption scheme which is fairly compatible with
the federal exemption scheme. This compatibility exists with respect to the practical operation of the Florida exemption requirements in conjunction with the federal requirements and exists in
spite of the fact that section 517.061(12) appears, on its face, to
differ from Regulation D in several significant respects. To the extent that section 517.061(12) is more lenient than Regulation D,
the more restrictive provisions of the federal scheme define the requirements with which an issuer must comply in order to qualify
for an exemption from both federal and state registration. Only to
the extent that section 517.061(12) is more restrictive than Regulation D is the Florida exemption incompatible in operation with the
federal scheme. The most notable respects in which the Florida exemption is more restrictive than Regulation D include the prohibition of the payment of a commission or compensation to unregistered dealers, the blanket prohibition on general solicitation and
general advertising which is more restrictive only with respect to
Rule 504 offerings, and section 517.061(12)'s requirement of a
three-day voidability provision. Additionally, the investor sophistication requirements injected into the exemption by rule 3E-500.07
of the Florida Administrative Code are incompatible with Regulation D.
Elimination of these requirements from the Florida exemption
standards would complete operational uniformity between the federal and state schemes. Such action would be well-advised, however, only if the advantage to issuers is not outweighed by unwarranted dilution of investor protection. The Florida prohibition on
the payment of commissions or compensation to unregistered dealers could, it seems, be eliminated without significant consequences
to investors. Because the payment of commissions to registered
dealers and nondealers is permitted, it is questionable whether
much protection is afforded investors by the current prohibition.
Additionally, it seems inappropriate to involve issuers in policing
dealer licensing rules by means of a scheme which places a great
premium on dealer status. Similarly, it seems that little investor
protection would be sacrificed by allowing general solicitation and
general advertising in the case of Rule 504 offerings. Because these
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offerings are limited to $500,000, it seems that issuers would seldom need or want to utilize such measures even if permitted. However, as to the three-day voidability provision of section
517.061(12), the case for keeping the Florida requirement is
stronger. This requirement seems to offer significant investor protection from high-pressure salesmen. In this instance, lack of compatibility with Regulation D may be justified when the interests of
investors are considered.
Although section 517.061(12) and Regulation D are largely compatible in operation, such compatibility is evident only after
thoughtful study and comparision of the two schemes. Furthermore, the compatibility is in one sense a one-sided proposition.
That is, while an issuer who complies with Regulation D comes
close to full compliance with section 517.061(12), the reverse is not
true. To the extent that the Florida exemption is more lenient
than Regulation D, compliance with 517.061(12) does not ensure
compliance with Regulation D. Moreover, the facial differences between the schemes are misleading and confusing, and the burden
on issuers to compare and analyze the respective requirements of
the two schemes to determine their operative effect seems unnecessary and unwarranted.
Florida could easily act to remedy not only the remaining operational differences but also the existing facial differences between
the state and federal schemes. The legislature could replace the
single Florida exemption of section 517.061(12) with three exemptions corresponding to Rules 504, 505, and 506. Alternatively, the
legislature could make the exemption of section 517.061(12) a true
private placement exemption, analogous to Rule 506, and the Department of Banking and Finance could, pursuant to its authority
in section 517.061(21), create limited offering exemptions corresponding to Rules 504 and 505. Additionally, in either event the
Department could, and should, modify rule 3E-500.07 of the Florida Administrative Code to conform with Regulation D. Not only
does that rule contain a trap for issuers by imposing purchaser sophistication requirements not readily evident from the face of the
statute, but it is more restrictive even than former Rule 146 and
certainly more so than current Regulation D. 50° Moreover, it constitutes a step away from uniformity with Regulation D while Flor150. In effect, Rule 3E-500.07 requires the purchaser to be not only sophisticated (either
in his individual capacity or with a representative/adviser), but also wealthy. Cf. Rule 146,
17 C.F.R. 230.146 (1982) and Rule 506(ii).
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ida's recent trend, as evidenced by the 1983 revisions to chapter
517, has been towards uniformity, or at least conformity, with Regulation D. Because Florida could increase operational uniformity
with Regulation D with comparatively little effect on investor protection, the state should consider modifying its current exemption
scheme to achieve such uniformity. Furthermore, because Florida
could, where there is already operational uniformity, achieve facial
uniformity with Regulation D at no cost to investors, the state
should act to effect such uniformity by statute or by statute and
rule.
B.

Uniformity Among the State Exemption Schemes

The ULOE as endorsed by NASAA provides an exemption
which is compatible with Rules 505 and 506. It incorporates the
requirements of Rules 501, 502, and 503 as well as those of Rule
505 and, under the ABA's recommendation, those of Rule 506. It
also contains additional requirements not found in Regulation D.
It should first be noted that to the extent the ULOE contains
requirements beyond those of Regulation D, the ULOE is, in one
sense, inconsistent with the federal exemption scheme. That is, an
issuer could not, by complying with Regulation D, ensure compliance with the ULOE. However, the ULOE contemplates a situation where an issuer complies with its requirements and thereby
ensures compliance with Regulation D and the exemptions of other
states. Furthermore, the call for adoption of the ULOE is actually
a call to the states to adopt the current version of the ULOE or
some less stringent conforming standard. If all states responded,
an issuer could, by complying with the requirements of NASAA's
version of the ULOE, be assured of complying with the requirements of those states.
The Florida exemption of section 517.061(12) is not far from
conforming to the ULOE. In fact, modification of Rule 3E-500.07
and elimination of the three-day voidability period and the prohibition against the payment of commissions to unregistered dealers
would create a conforming Florida exemption. As previously noted,
the only one of the statutory modifications which might significantly affect investor protection is the elimination of the three-day
voidability period. The additional step of eliminating the prohibition on general solicitation and general advertising in Rule 504type offerings would result in an exemption which is compatible
with Regulation D and which conforms with the ULOE.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The current Florida exemption scheme is, in operation, largely
compatible with Regulation D. This compatibilty is not, however,
readily apparent from the face of section 517.061(12). The Florida
exemption also comes close to conforming with the ULOE. The
same modifications to the Florida exemption which would produce
an exemption scheme facially and operationally compatible with
Regulation D would simultaneously cause the Florida exemption to
conform to the ULOE. Most of the changes needed to effect uniformity would not cause significant dilution of investor protection,
and those which might must be considered with respect to the
needs of issuers as well as those of investors. In light of the fact
that such changes would significantly aid issuers seeking federal
and state exemption from registration and, to a lesser extent, aid
issuers seeking exemption from registration in multiple states, the
Florida legislature and the Department of Banking and Finance
should seriously consider taking these further steps towards uniformity in federal-state and multistate securities registration exemption requirements.

